Muslim Americans speak up on 9/11
Ten years on, Muslim Americans reflect on the struggle their communities face in the US post 9/11.
- Autoplay OnOff
- Video feedback
- Video settings
Ten years after Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda launched the September 11 attacks on the US, the terrorism debate in Australia continues to revolve around persistent myths. Let's put a few of them to the test, beginning with the notion that the group is no longer a threat to Australia.
As al-Qaeda enters its third decade as a global terrorist organisation, many believe it is unlikely to recover from a combination of strategic weaknesses. The death of Osama bin Laden and his replacement by Ayman al-Zawahiri are unlikely to bring the same levels of support or direction to the group.
Repeated drone strikes in Pakistan and Afghanistan have compromised al-Qaeda's ability to find sanctuary and to conduct major operations. And, despite Zawahiri's best efforts, the Arab Spring uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Syria, have not been conducted under al-Qaeda's banner.
Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri. Photo: AFP
But there is no evidence that ''al-Qaedaism'' as a motivating ideology for the global Salafist jihad is going to dissolve any time soon.
Increasingly, the ''war on terror'' is a conflict not just against al-Qaeda central, but against al-Qaeda's associates, affiliates and support networks in Africa, Asia and the Middle East.
Although many of these groups reject al-Qaeda's methods, the local and global manifestations of Islamist terrorism are in fact converging.
Of the 20 major terrorist plots against the West uncovered in 2010, only one was connected to the core al-Qaeda leadership, four were attributed to franchise groups or affiliates operating out of Yemen or Somalia, and the other 15 originated from grassroots militants.
In Australia, domestic security and intelligence agencies have disrupted four major ''home-grown'' terrorist plots since 9/11. But others will emerge. The most recent edition of al-Qaeda's English-language magazine, Inspire, contains a photo of the Sydney Opera House with instructions to individuals living in the West on how to conduct ''open source'' jihad, including a detailed recipe for making acetone peroxide explosives. If anything, the al-Qaeda threat to Australia today is higher than it was 10 years ago.
A second myth to be tested is that national security policies have been fixed.
In the decade after 9/11, the Australian government spent more than $10 billion on counter-terrorism efforts - expanding the intelligence community, making legislative changes, strengthening co-ordination and creating a host of new institutions.
Claims that the additional resources should now be returned to traditional pursuits such as diplomacy and development assistance miss the point.
Building a more effective national security framework requires constant vigilance, innovation and money. Despite some good progress, significant gaps in our security arrangements remain.
The absence of a comprehensive risk assessment limits the government's ability to identify and prioritise national security threats.
Previous counterterrorism strategies that focused simply on defeating al-Qaeda's organisational hubs and spokes by military force have missed the more important goal of defeating the ideas that foment extremist violence. Of the $10 billion Australia has spent on national security reforms since 2001, less than 1 per cent has been allocated to countering the ideology that fuels religious extremism at home.
Governments need to understand that success in this war will come when the violent ideas associated with it are rejected and discarded.
Finally, there is a view that Jemaah Islamiah in Indonesia is broken and that Bali is safe.
Since 9/11, most Australian fatalities from terrorist attacks have occurred in south-east Asia. In response, Indonesian counterterrorism officials have done a good job of killing or capturing many of the original leaders of Jemaah Islamiah, including most recently its spiritual head, Abu Bakar Bashir. The infrastructure of terrorism in Indonesia today is fragmented, disjointed and lacking coherence.
But the broader jihadist community in south-east Asia is debating future directions - a debate that has been characterised as between the advocates of either organisational or individual jihad.
However, the problem is not an either/or question. Fuelled by the writings of al-Qaeda theorists such as Abu Musab al-Suri, the preferred strategy is now simultaneously institutional and atomised. Some members of the old jihadist network in Indonesia have taken on the mantle of ''freelance mujahideen'', individuals prepared to fight alone or alongside any group that wants to promote the idea of jihad musallah, or armed jihad.
Although these individuals have focused recent attention on attacking the Indonesian state, Bali nightclubs and Western hotels will remain targets.
In the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 bombings, former CIA analyst Paul Pillar wrote that ''terrorism cannot be defeated - only reduced, attenuated, and to some degree controlled''. A decade later, the goal remains the same.
Dr Carl Ungerer is director of the national security program at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute and a visiting fellow at Georgetown University.
Follow the National Times on Twitter: @NationalTimesAU
.gif)
39 comments
More comments
Comments are now closed